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From Piracy to Prostitution - State Forfeiture of an
Innocent Owner's Property: Bennis v. Michigan
Why should a person who's totally innocent, who has done
whatever they could do to stop the crime, who has no knowledge of it ... be punished by having to give up their property?1

I.

INTRODUCTION

How confident are you that your property is safe from seizure?2 The
United States Constitution clearly states that an individual shall not be
deprived of property without due process of law. 3 However, in order to
gain a complete understanding of the potential limitations on your property rights, "[i]magine owning an expensive piece of property ... [n]ow
imagine having your property forcefully taken away from you because
someone suspects, or pretends to suspect, that you are using the property
in the commission of criminal acts. " 4 Most people might not believe that
this could happen in America. 5 They would, however, be wrong. 6
Because traditional modes of punishment, such as fines and imprisonment, have proven ineffective in halting the highly profitable drug trade,
civil forfeiture of real property has become a powerful deterrent of such
criminal activity. 7 Between 1985 and 1991, the number of federal forfeitures increased over eighteen times to a total of 35,295, and the amount
deposited into the Asset Forfeiture Fund has grown from $93.7 million in
1986 to $555.7 million in 1993. 8 The profitability of this law enforcement

* Copyright © 1997 by Charlena Toro.
1. United States Supreme Court Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, 1995 WL 712350
(Jan 11, 1995).
2. See generally Henry Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights 1-4 (1995).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; U.S. CaNST. amend. V.
4. James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment After Austin, 19
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
5. !d. at 2.
6. ld.
7. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993). A forfeiture is "[a]
comprehensive term which means a divestiture of specific property without compensation; it
imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right without compensation." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
8. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, And Profitable Also Be Fair?, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
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mechanism may explain why the number of civil forfeitures is escalating
at a rapid rate. 9
Under current forfeiture procedures, law enforcement agencies may
seize property used in connection with criminal conduct, sell it on the
open market, and retain the sale proceeds. 10 A significant portion of law
enforcement agency revenue is now largely dependent on the aggressive
pursuit of seizable property. 11 Put simply, the more property that agencies
confiscate, the more money such agencies will receive. 12 According to a
previous otlicial in the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Section,
"the departments 'marching orders' were: '[f]orfeit, forfeit, forfeit. Get
money, get money, get money.' " 13 The government has pursued such a
policy even to the extent of encroaching on the personal freedom of individuals who all too frequently are completely unaware of any wrongdoing.l4
Innocent and unknowing property owners commonly fall victim to
civil forfeiture provisions. 15 Examples are prolific. 16 Paul and Ruth
Derbacher, an elderly couple, had invited their twenty-three year old
grandson Julian to live with them. 17 When a police search uncovered marijuana and cocaine belonging to their grandson, the Derbacher's Connecticut home was confiscated. 18 Similarly, Willie Jones, an innocent black
nurseryman from Tennessee allegedly fitting the profile for a drug cou-

9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. There are billions of civil forfeiture dollars spent without legislative controls. Hyde,
supra note 2, at 6. Thus, law enforcement agencies have been "[s]kirting safeguards provided by
the normal governmental appropriations process, billions of dollars worth of property and hundreds
of millions of dollars in cash fall into the hands of police and prosecutors, then are spent (and
often misspent) with no control or oversight by elected legislative bodies -- and little or no
accounting to anyone, much less to the public." Id.
11. Cheh, supra note 8, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citations omitted).
14. Hyde, supra note 2, at 2.
15. See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
17. William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Fmfeiture Statutes: Analysis and
Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1994). Following is what happened when police
officers raided Ruth and Paul Derbacher's Connecticut home:
[The police] found fifteen pounds of marijuana, several ounces of cocaine, and several
firearms, which included sawed-off shotguns fitted with bayonets. Paul and Ruth were
arrested on charges of possession of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute.
Their twenty-three year old grandson Julian was convicted of multiple crimes, having
tried to burn down his girlfriend's house and having robbed a convenience store while
dressed up as Rambo and armed with an assault rifle. At their trial, the defense
contended that the Derbachers lived in terror of Julian and never ventured into his part
of the house. The couple fmally settled with the government, agreeing to sell the house
and split the proceeds.
/d. at 1093-1094.
18. /d. at 1090.
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rier, had $9,600 improperly seized by Nashville police as he boarded a
plane to buy shrubbery in Houston. 19 Likewise, Donald Scott, a millionaire rancher, was shot and killed by Los Angeles police officers when
they attempted to serve him with an illegal search warrant. 20 Later the

19.

!d. The following passage details the civil forfeiture abuse experienced by Willie Jones:

[Willie Jones was] a Na~hville landscaper who in 1991 bought an airline ticket to
Houston with cash. That prompted an airline employee to tip off the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) in the hope of collecting a 10 percent commission on any drug moneys
that might be seized. The Department of Justice pays out about $24 million annually
to such tipsters. A search of Mr. Jones revealed no drugs, but he had $9.600 in his
wallet. A drug-sniffing dog supposedly detected traces of drugs on the money, a fact
of slight merit because about 96 percent of all currency in circulation, whether carried
by clergy men or <-Tack dealers, has such traces. Mr. Jones was not arrested but his
cash, which wa~ intended for the purchase of shrubbery, wa~ confiscated. He was
unable to post a bond for 10 percent of the money in order to mount a legal challenge
to the fotieiture. It nearly drove him out of business. He lamented, 'I didn't know it
was against the law for a 42-year-old black man to have money in his pocket." Jones
had no police record and could produce documents showing that he regularly made such
trips to buy from nurseries that demanded cash. Luckily, a distinguished lawyer who
heard about Jones's case volunteered to represent him. As a result a federal district
court judge in Nashville tongue-lashed the conduct of the DEA officers who took
Jones's money and ordered them to return it. Most such ca~es do not have happy
endings.
Leonard W. Levy, A License To Steal: The Forfeiture Of Property, 3-4 (1996).
In addition, Congressman Hyde articulated the following:
Government abuse of asset fmfeiture discriminates against minority Americans,
especially African-Americans and Hispanics. T11eir often meager property and ca~h are
seized at a far greater rate than that of whites because those minorities are said to fit
stereotypical drug courier profiles prepared by insensitive police. In Memphis, 75
percent of the air travelers stopped by dT'tg police were black, yet only 4 percent of the
flying public is black.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 6.
20. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090. The following pa~sage provides the story of Donald
Scott:
[Donald Scott was] a multimillionaire, who owned a two-hundred-acre ranch in Ventura
County, California. In the wee hours of the night in 1992, thirty-one lawmen from eight
agencies, including DEA agents and Los Angeles police, occupied the ranch and
smashed in the door of Scott's home with a battering ram. Five officers, guns drawn,
rushed in. Scott, groggy from sleep and a drunken stupor, grabbed his revolver and ran
into the outer room. Officers ordered him to drop the weapon. As he lowered it, he was
shot dead before his wife. A search of the property yielded no drugs. Nor did the
officers find marijuana growing on it. despite a tip from an informant. Indeed, before
the fatal raid, the California National Guard had photographed the property from the air,
and so had the DEA. The inconclusive results had led to a furtive ground scan of the
Scott property by the United States Border Patrol, but no marijuana wa~ found.
Nevertheless a local judge issued a search warrant, which led to the raid on Scott's
home and to his subsequent death. The search warrant later turned out to be illegal,
because it lacked probable cause. A Ventura County investigation also concluded that
the border patrol illegally trespassed on the property and that the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department had been motivated by a desire to seize and fotieit the ranch for
the benefit of the various Ia w enforcement agencies that had been involved. The
property 'was worth millions of dollars,' said the district attorney of Ventura County,
and the Ventura County sheriff 'was not called because Los Angeles County did not
want to split the fotieiture proceeds with that agency.' The L.A. County sheriff
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Ventura County District Attorney determined that one motivation for the
search warrant was to enable the officers to find contraband to support
the seizure of Donald Scott's million dollar property. 21 Finally, Billy
Munnerlyn's Lear jet was seized in an erroneous civil forfeiture by officers of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), who caused $185,000 in
damages and recovery costs. 22 As a result ·of these expenses, Billy
Munnerlyn was forced into bankruptcy and is now a truck driver. 23 These
are only four examples of civil forfeiture abuses, and "[a]s the individual
horror stories multiply, people are realizing they could easily be the next
victims of government run amok. "24

conceded that before they sought a warrant they had discussed forfeiture of the property,
as they always do whenever a large amount of money or property is implicated, but
denied that the interest in the forfeiture dominated concern for crime. However, the
Scotts had committed no crime, and the drug experts in the law enforcement agencies
appear to have confused ivy with marijuana.
Levy, supra note 19, at 1, 6-7.
21. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090.
22. Id. The story regarding Billy Munnerlyn and his experiences with the governmental
abuse of ci vii forfeiture is as follows:
Billy Munnerlyn, who had an air charter service, flew a passenger from Little Rock to
Ontario, California, in 1989. DEA officers seized the passenger's luggage, finding $2.7
million in it. Although the government dropped the arrest charges against Munnerlyn,
who knew nothing about the drug money, it refused to return his Lear jet. He sold three
smaller planes and his office equipment to pay $80,000 in legal fees, but his attempt
to force the return of his jet failed when a federal district court ruled against him. The
government offered to return the plane for $66,000, which he could not afford. He
finally got it back for $7,000 only to discover that government agents, having ripped
the plane apart in a futile search for drugs, caused damage of at least $50,000, for
which the DEA is not liable. Munnerlyn declared bankruptcy, lost his business, and
became a truck driver.
Levy, supra note 19 at 1, 4-5.
23. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090.
24. Hyde, supra note 1, at 3. The following passages are other examples of civil forfeiture
abuses:
In 1988 customs agents seized the Atlantis II, an $80 million research vessel owned by
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. The pretext for confiscating
the vessel was the fact that a drug-sniffing dog foUild about one one-hundredth of an
ounce of marijuana in a crewman's shaving kit. The public outcry in this instance was
exceptional, because of the trivial pretext for the seizure and because the oceanographic
institution had no knowledge that a crewman used marijuana; as a result of the public
response, the United States had to return the vessel.
Levy, supra note 19, at 1, 2.
Following is a similar situation:
Professor Craig Klein [who] was equally innocent but not as lucky. He bought a new
sailboat for $24,000, which was being delivered to him in Jacksonville, Florida.
Customs agents in Florida waters commonly suspect boats of carrying drugs. They
conducted a seven-hour search of Klein's sailboat by ripping out its woodwork,
smashing its engine., rupturing its fuel tank, and drilling thirty holes into its hull, many
below the water line. The officers, who found no drugs, damaged the boat beyond
repair. Klein sold it for scrap.
!d.
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the civil forfeiture of an automobile in Bennis v. Michigan. 25 The automobile, a 1977
Pontiac, was purchased jointly by John and Tina Bennis for $600. 26 When
John Bennis was arrested for committing an illicit act in the Pontiac, the
car was seized and ultimately became the subject of a civil forfeiture action. 27 Tina Bennis challenged the forfeiture because she had no knowledge of, or involvement in, her husband's criminal activity. 28 The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the fact that Tina Bennis, as co-owner
of the car, was innocent, and ultimately approved the forfeiture. 29
This Note will demonstrate the inequity of the Bennis decision, noting that Tina Bennis' property interest in the Bennis family car should not
have been forfeited. 30 This Note will further examine the government's
recent abuse of civil forfeiture, demonstrating in itself a "long and unbroken line" of examples of governmental abuse. 31 Finally, this Note will
predict the wide spread ramifications of the Bennis decision, concluding
that civil forfeiture reform should be embraced. 32
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In September 1988, Tina and John Bennis purchased a 1977 Pontiac
sedan for John Bennis to commute to work. 33 On October 3, 1988, Detroit

Following is another example of the government's abuse:
Mrs. Selena Washington . . . had the misfortune of carrying a lot of cash. She was
driving along Interstate 95 in eastern Florida on her way to buy construction materials
to repair her home, which had been damaged by Hurricane Hugo. Interstate 95 is a
pipeline for illegal drugs, and the sheriff's department of Volusia County makes it a
practice of stopping suspicious-looking vehicles, often those driven by blacks because
a majority of people who transport drug money is in fact black. The sheriff stops cars
going south-presumably those with cash to buy controlled substances-rarely tho"e
going north with caches of drugs. The sheriff's purpose is to hunt for cash. Within a
few years his department confiscated about $8 million in cash believed to be narcotics
moneys. When a deputy stopped Mrs. Washington late one night, his search of her
purse yielded $19,000, which he confiscated a8 drug money. She protested vehemently
and asked to be taken to the police station to clarify the matter, but he simply drove
off. He did not even take her name. She had the nerve to follow him back to the police
station to lodge a protest. An attorney, whom she hired to represent her, advised
settlement because of the expense of contending a forfeiture suit. The sheriff kept
$4,000, the lawyer $1,200, and she got back the rest.
!d. at 2-3.
25. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
26. !d. at 997.
27. !d.
28. !d.
29. !d. at 995.
30. See infra notes 33-111, 310-317, 324-412 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 112-310, 361-412 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 407-453 and accompanying text.
33. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996). Tina Bennis, who was a 38 year-old
mother of five children, remained married to John Bennis after his arrest. Richard Ryan, High
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law enforcement officers, Jacob Anthony and John Howe, initiated surveillance of a woman after observing her "flagging" down passing vehicles. 34 The woman, later identified as Kathy Polarchio, flagged down and
entered the 1977 Pontiac driven by John Bennis. 35 Police officers
Anthony and Howe arrested John Bennis after observing that he and Ms.
Polarchio were engaged in sexual activity inside the Bennis family car. 36
John Bennis was subsequently charged and convicted of violating MICH.
COMP. LAW§ 750.338(b), which prohibits gross indecency. 37 As a result,
a civil forfeiture action was initiated to seize the Pontiac under MICH.
COMP. LAWS§§ 600.3801 and 600.3825. 3R

Court Has Lively Debate Over State Case: Forfeiture Issue Involving Car Used For Prostitution
Amuses Some Justices, Detroit News, November 30, 1995, at 12A; Richard Ryan, Court Allows
Seizure Of Innocent Owner's Property, Detroit News, March 5, 1996 at Al. Tina Bennis worked
a newspaper route with one of her children, in order to "make ends meet." David G. Savage,
Innocence Punished, A.B.A. J. May 1996 at 47. Tina Bennis also cleaned office buildings and
worked at a school cafeteria as a cook. !d.
34. Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W.2d. 483, 486 (1994). "Flagging'' is how prostitutes "solicit
business from potential customers in passing vehicles." ld.
35. ld.
36. Bennis v. Michigan, 504 N.W.2d 731 (1993).
37. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 996. John Bennis pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of indecency
and was ordered to pay $250 and perform community service. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Bennis,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
The Michigan statute prohibiting gross indecency provides in pertinent part:
Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission
of any act of gross indecency with a female person shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable as provided in this section. Any female person who, in public or private,
commit.~ or is a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency with a male
person shall be guilty of a felony punishable as provided in this section. Any person
who procures or attempts to procure the commission of any act of gross indecency by
and between any male person and any female person shall be guilty of a felony as
provided in this section. Any person convicted of a felony as provided in this section
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by
a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense
a sexually delinquent person, may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of
which shall be life.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.338(b) (West 1995).
38. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. The Bennis family car was forfeited because according to
Michigan law: "[a]ny building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation, or prostitution or gambling, or used by or kept for the use of prostitutes . . . is
declared a nuisance . . . and all . . . nuisances shall be. enjoined and abated . . . . " /d.; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1987).
In addition, the abatement statute provides:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as
provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the
judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place
of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the
manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution . . . . "(2) Vehicles, sale. Any
vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance within the meaning of this
chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and
contents as herein provided . . . .
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The Wayne County prosecutor filed a civil action in the Wayne
County Circuit Court, alleging that John Bennis had used the Bennis family car for an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution." 39 According
to the prosecutor, when the Pontiac was used for such a purpose, it became an abatable nuisance. 40 Tina Bennis challenged the abatement of the
Pontiac because she was unaware of her husband's criminal conduct. 41
Despite Tina Bennis' lack of knowledge, the circuit court declared the
automobile a nuisance, ordered the forfeiture, and terminated her interest
in the automobile. 42
Although the trial judge had the discretion to order one-half of the
sale proceeds after costs to be paid to the innocent co-owner, the trial
judge refused, noting that the Bennises owned another vehicle and were
not left without transportation when the Pontiac was confiscated. 43 As a
key factor in his decision to remit all of the sale proceeds to the State, the
trial judge noted that "(t]here's practically nothing left minus costs in a
situation such as this. "44 As a result, Tina and John Bennis appealed the
circuit court's decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals. 45
On appeal, the Bennises argued that the prosecutor failed to prove
that Tina Bennis had knowledge of John Bennis' criminal use of the car
and that, because only one incident occurred in the automobile, insufficient evidence existed to target the automobile for abatement as a
nuisance. 46 The fact that the record provided no indication that Tina
Bennis was aware of her husband's criminal use of the automobile proved
persuasive to the court. 47 Moreover, the court of appeals held that the

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.3825 (West 1987).
Kathy Polarchio, the prostitute with John Bennis when he was arrested, was arrested the
following day for "accosting and soliciting." Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W. 2d. at 486. Ms.
Polarchio had previously been arrested for this offense as well as the offenses of disorderly conduct
and indecent and offensive conduct. /d.
39. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
40. /d. An abatement is "[a] reduction, a decrease, or a diminution. The suspension or
cessation, in whole or in part, of a continuing charge, such as rent." BlACK'S LAW DicriONARY
4 (6th ed. 1990). A nuisance is "that activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or
unlawful use by a person of his own property, working obstruction or injury to right of another,
or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort that law
will presume resulting damage." /d. at 1065. (citations omitted).
41. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
42. /d. at 996. The Michigan Statute provides that "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence
of the nuisance on the part of the defendant~ or any of them, is not required." MICH. COMP. ANN.
LAWS § 600.3815(2) (West 1987).
43. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
44. /d.
45. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
46. /d. at 733.
47. /d. at 732-33.
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prosecutor had the burden of proving that Tina Bennis was aware of the
vehicle's criminal use in order for her interest to be abated. 48
In addition, the court of appeals stated that one criminal incident was
insufficient to qualify the automobile as an abatable nuisance. 49 The court
of appeals reasoned that "[j]ust as one incident of prostitution does not
create a brothel out of a family hotel, neither does one isolated incident of
prohibited conduct in a vehicle necessarily make the vehicle a
nuisance. "50
The Bennises also contended that the prosecutor did not bring the car
within the scope of the abatement statute because he failed to
demonstrate that an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution"
occurred in the automobile. 51 The court of appeals accepted this line of
reasoning because John Bennis was convicted of gross indecency, not an
act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution." 52 Furthermore, the court of
appeals noted that insufficient evidence existed to prove that the incident
involving John Bennis and Ms. Polarchio included the payment of
money. 53 After noting the absence of a proven exchange of money, the
court of appeals concluded that John Bennis' behavior amounted to gross
indecency, not an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."54 For
these reasons, the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision,
holding the forfeiture improper. 55 The State appealed the court of
appeals' decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. 56
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
court of appeals, concluding that the Bennis family car was an abatable
nuisance as a matter of law. 57 Upon review of the statute, the supreme
court concluded that evidence of a money exchange was unnecessary
when the circumstances clearly indicated that the sexual act was in exchange for money. 58 The supreme court noted as "particularly persuasive
the fact that Mr. Bennis engaged in this act with a known prostitute in an

48. Id. at 732.
49. ld. at 733.
50. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 734.
51. ld. The prosecution conceded in its brief that the "defendant John Bennis was charged
only with gross indecency, and further admits that there is no evidence that Mr. Bennis paid or
intended to pay Ms. Polarchio." Id. at 735.
52. Id. at 734.
53. ld. at 735.
54. ld. at 735.
55. Bennis. 116 S. Ct. at 995.
56. Bennis, 527 N.W. 2d at 483.
57. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
58. Bemris, 527 N.W. 2d at 486. One consequence of the nuisance theory articulated by the
Michigan Supreme Court "is that the very same offense, committed in the very same car, would
not render the car forfeitable if it were parked in a different part of Detroit such as the affluent
Palmer Woods area." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006.
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area reputed for illicit activity," and thus concluded that the Bennis car
was properly abatable. 59
In light of precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court also stated that the
unavailability of an innocent-owner defense in Michigan was constitutionally inconsequential. 60 The supreme court reinstated the forfeiture of
the Pontiac, noting that the law permits the confiscation of an innocent
owner's property unless that property was stolen or used without the
owner's authorization. 61 Tina Bennis subsequently appealed the Michigan
Supreme Court's ruling to the United States Supreme Court. 62
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the forfeiture violated Tina Bennis' constitutional rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 63
Tina Bennis maintained that the forfeiture was unconstitutional because
she did not know that her husband would use the family car in an illegal
manner. 64 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held
that a "long and unbroken line" of cases provided that an innocent
owner's property may be forfeited if the property was used illegally. 65
Justice Rehnquist stated that even though Tina Bennis was unaware of
her husband's illicit conduct, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not insulate her against civil forfeiture. 66
As support for her constitutional challenge, Tina Bennis relied on an
excerpt from a case cited by the Bennis majority, which provided that "it
would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of ... an owner who
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property."67 Upon the concession by
Tina Bennis that the passage was mere dicta, Justice Rehnquist noted that
"[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must
attend." 68 Justice Rehnquist further negated Tina Bennis' argument by

59. Bennis, 529 N.W. 2d at 488.
60. !d. at 494.
61. Gary Heinlein, Wife Wants Car Back; Appeals to High Court; County Seized Vehicle
After Her Husband Was Caught With Prostitute, The Detroit News, June 6, 1995 at 04.
62. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (No. 94-8729).
63. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan
Supreme Court determination with a 5-4 decision. !d. at 996. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion
of the court, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. !d. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg
wrote concurring opinions. !d. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Justices Souter and Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed an additional dissenting opinion. !d.
64. !d. at 998.
65. !d.
66. !d. at 999.
67. !d. (quoting Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 945 S. Ct. 2080, 2094-95
(1974)).
68. !d. at 999. (citations omitted).
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explaining the value of civil forfeiture as a deterrent. 69 Justice Rehnquist
maintained that when property is seized, criminal conduct is deterred because it prevents the further illicit use of the property and imposes an
economic penalty on the owner, "thereby rendering illegal conduct unprofitable. "70
In addition to asserting the innocent owner's defense, Tina Bennis
argued that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision was a violation of the
rights conferred to her under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 71 The majority also rejected this challenge, noting
that the State cannot be required to compensate an owner for property
that the State has lawfully acquired under authority other than that of eminent domain. 72 The majority concluded, just as it had seventy-five years
earlier, that the cases which bind the Supreme Court are "too t1rmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced. "73
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that no
bright line provides "what property can be forfeited as a result of what
wrongdoing."74 Thus, there is confusion concerning both the scope of the
property which may be seized and the type of wrongdoing for which forfeiture may be imposed. 75 Justice Thomas further noted the significance
of these parameters as the sole criteria on which the State's authority to
confiscate property rests. 76 In circumstances in which an innocent coowner is involved, Justice Thomas stated that limitations should be applied strictly and should adhere to historical standards for determining
whether property is the instrumentality of a crime. 77 Justice Thomas cTiticized, however, the fact that Tina Bennis failed to argue that the Pontiac
was not an instrumentality of John Bennis' crime, and as a result
concluded that she was not entitled to such strict limitations. 78
Justice Thomas also recognized that the State's characterization of
the Pontiac as an abatable nuisance was in part to prevent John Bennis

Id. at 1000.
70. ld.
71. Id.
72. ld. The United States Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' property
69.

interest in the car "was not a taking of private property for public use in violation of the takings
clause." ld. at 994.
73. ld. at 1000. (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 25 U.S. 505
(1921)).
74. /d. at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring).

75. ld.
76. /d. Justice Thomas stated that it was unclear to him "what it means to 'use' property
for crime under civil forfeiture laws." /d.
77. Id. at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. Id.
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from using the car for further illicit activity. 79 Justice Thomas noted that
under a different statutory procedure the Bennis car might have been destroyed, thus giving the State a plausible argument that the order was remedial and therefore not compensable. 80 Justice Thomas stated that even
though the State ordered the car sold instead of destroyed, that decision
did not substantially change the remedial nature of the State's action. 81
Justice Thomas further noted that if the forfeiture of the car could be
properly labeled remedial, problems stemming from the punishment of an
innocent owner would not arise. 82
Justice Thomas concluded that even though the seizure of an innocent
owner's property is inequitable, the statute was nevertheless
constitutional due to historical precedent and the wide acceptance of related laws. 83 Justice Thomas warned, however, that if improperly utilized,
seizure could be wielded like a roulette wheel, used to raise revenue from
innocent and unsuspecting owners who are unaware that their property is
being misused, or to punish individuals who associate with criminals,
rather than as an element of a fair and impartial system of justice. 84 In
addition, Justice Thomas articulated that "[t]his case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is
inten~ely undesirable." 85
Justice Ruth Bader Gin~burg wrote a concurring opinion in which she
noted that John and Tina Bennis owned the forfeited Pontiac jointly and
that John Bennis had Tina Bennis' consent to use the car. 86 Justice
Ginsburg agreed with the majority that half of the sale proceeds should
not be remitted to Tina Bennis. 87 Moreover, because the car was so inexpensive, virtually no money would remain after court costs were deducted
from the sale proceeds to pay Tina Bennis for her interest in the vehicle. 88
Justice Ginsburg noted that because the Bennises also owned a 1984 Ford
van, the forfeiture of the Pontiac did not leave them without transportation. 89 In addition, Justice Ginsburg commented that "Michigan, in short,
has not embarked on an experiment to punish 'innocent' third parties.

79. !d. Civil forfeiture of property "without proof of the owner's wrongdoing, merely
because it was 'used' in or was an 'instrumentality' of crime has been permitted in England, and
this country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." !d.
80. !d. (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. !d.
82. !d.
83. !d. at 1004.
84. !d. at 1003.
85. !d. at 1001-1002.
86. !d. at 1003. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
87. !d.
88. !d. Justice Ginsburg recognized that the trial judge could have remitted half of the sale
proceeds to Tina Bennis, based on her lack of criminal culpability. !d.
89. !d. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Nor do we condone any such experiment. Michigan has decided to deter
Johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this court's disapprobation. "90
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Steven Breyer, criticized the State's ability to
seize a vehicle, or for that matter an airplane or hotel, simply because one
customer possessed contraband on the premises without the owner's
knowledge. 91 In addition, Justice Stevens stated that no real connection
existed between the forfeited property in this case and the illegal act performed.92 Specifically, since the Bennis family car was not needed to effectuate the crime of solicitation, Justice Stevens argued that this lack of
nexus distinguished the present case from historical precedent. 93 Justice
Stevens emphasized Tina Bennis' complete lack of culpability and articulated the following:
For centuries prostitutes have been plying their trade on other
people's property. Assignations have occurred in palaces, luxury
hotels, cruise ships, college dormitories, truck stops, back alleys,
and back seats. A profession of this vintage has provided governments with countless opportunities to use novel weapons to curtail abuses. As far as I am aware, however, it was not until 1988
that any State decided to experiment with the punishment of
innocent third parties by confiscating property in which, a single
transaction with a prostitute has been consummated. 94
Justice Stevens also criticized the State's attempt to characterize the
seizure of the Pontiac as exclusively remedial and not punitive. 95 Justice
Stevens noted, however, that even if this argument was valid, the forfeiture would still be excessive. 96 Moreover, Justice Stevens stated that the
majority itself conceded that the forfeiture was, at least in part, punitive. 97

!d.
Id. at 1003-1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended the following:
The state surely may impose strict obligations on the owners of airlines, hotels, stadiums
and vehicles to exercise a high degree of care to prevent others from making illegal use
of their property, but neither logic nor history support~ the Court's apparent a.~sumption
that their complete innocence imposes no constitutional impediment to the seizure of
their property simply because it provided the locus for a criminal transaction.
ld. at 1004.
92. !d. at 1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. !d. at 1005-06, 1007.
94. !d. at 1003.
95. ld. at 1006.
96. ld.
97. !d. at 1006-1007.
90.
91.
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In fact, at an earlier stage in this case, the State "unequivocally argued
that confiscation of automobiles in the circumstances of this case 'is swift
and certain punishment of the voluntary vice consumer.' " 98 Therefore,
Justice Stevens concluded that any argument that this forfeiture was not
punishment was simply not plausible. 99
Although the majority insisted that an owner of property is strictly
liable for illegal activity for which that property has been used, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Supreme Court has previously recognized an
exception for individuals who are truly blameless. 100 Justice Stevens criticized the majority for ignoring the possible application of an exception in
the present case without explanation or comment." 101 Because Tina
Bennis was ignorant of her husband's criminal intentions, and certainly
not aware that her husband would use the family car to solicit prostitution, Justice Stevens reasoned that the profound unfairness of this particular seizure made it unconstitutional. 102
Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's attempt to characterize
the instant case as one of vicarious liability. 103 As support for this criticism, Justice Stevens noted the majority's failure to acknowledge that an
employer is exonerated from vicarious liability when its employee ventures off on a "frolic."104 In addition, Justice Stevens favored the application of an analysis which would place property that is subject to forfeiture
into one of three categories: pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, and instrumentalities utilized in the commission of a crime. 105 Under
this analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that forfeiture of the Bennis car
was improper. 106
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued
against the majority's analogous application of admiralty law to
situations involving automobiles. 107 As support for his contention that the
analogy was improper, Justice Kennedy stated that forfeiture based in
admiralty law sought to punish owners located on the other side of the
world who would have otherwise been outside the limited reach of the
law .108 Justice Kennedy noted that automobiles are a "practical
necessity," and unlike sea-faring vessels, criminal acts involving automo-

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

!d. at 1007.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 1008, 1010.
!d. at 1009.
!d.
/d. at 1008.

!d. at 1004-1005.
/d. at 1011. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
/d. at 1010.
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biles usually have only a tangential connection to the vehicle itself. 109 In
addition, Justice Kennedy criticized the State's position that a co-owner's
interest in property can be so insignificant as to be outside the law's protection.110 Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the seizure involved in
this case failed to achieve the minimum standard of constitutional protection required by the Due Process Clause. 111
III. BACKGROUND

Civil forfeiture is premised on a legal fiction which personifies property.u2 Under this ''personification theory," objects can be guilty of criminal conduct. 113 Guilty objects may be subject to various forms of punishment, including civil forfeiture. 114 The theory that the object is the guilty
thing is as old as the Old Testament, is rooted in medieval doctrine, and
has historically been applied in admiralty law. 115 In the Old Testament,
inanimate objects and animals could be considered guilty of wrongdoing. 116 In medieval times, deodands were forfeited to the crown. 117 In admiralty law, ships and cargo were seized for the failure to pay customs
duties. 118 Thus, civil forfeiture is an ancient concept which has been rekindled in American courts by what is commonly referred to today as
"the war on drugs." 119

A

Deodands

A medieval English writer once stated that, "[w]here a man killeth
another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as
deodand, and yet no default is in the owner.'' 12° Civil forfeiture began in
this spirit, and in this spirit civil forfeiture has thrived. 121 Deodand, derived from the Latin phrase "deo dandum" (meaning "given to God") was
described in the Book of Exodus: "[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman that
they die, the ox shall be surely stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten." 122

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

!d. at 1011.
!d.
!d.
Hyde, supra note 2. at 17.
!d.
!d.
!d. at viii.
!d.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 17.
!d.
!d. at vii.
Levy, supra note 19, at 8.
!d. at 7.
!d. (citations omitted).
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The Greeks of Periclean Athens believed that inanimate objects could
have personalities and be possessed by the Furies of mythology. 123 Under
their belief system, if an object killed a person then the accused object
could be formally tried, convicted, and banished to protect Athens from
pollution. 124 Along this line, Plato wrote the following:
And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case
of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods-whether a
man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him or his falling on
them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbor to be a
judge and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt.
And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border. 125
In theory, a deodand was an object seized and given to God for the
benefit of the community. 126 However, in reality, the seized property went
to the English Crown. 127 The value of the deodand was forfeited to the
King under the assumption that the money would provide a mass to be
held in honor of the dead person's soul or to ensure that the deodand was
put to a charitable purpose. 128 In England, the procedure used against an
accused object was an in rem proceeding, which literally means "against
the thing." 129 After a guilty object was personified and considered tainted,
the property could not lose this stigma, regardless of subsequent ownership.13o
Moreover, the nineteenth century laws of England provided that if a
bull injured a person, then the bull would be targeted for retribution. 131
Likewise, if a tree fell on a man and he died as a result, his relatives could
avenge his death by cutting down the tree and scattering the bark chips. 132
If a man drowned in a well, then the well could he t1lled. 133 Or, if a person was stung to death by bees, the whole bee colony could he suffocated
in their hive. 134

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
otherwise

!d. at 9.
!d.
!d.
Levy, supra note 19, at 7.
!d.
Ca1ero-To1edo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
Hyde, supra note 2, at 18.

!d.
Levy, supra note 19, at 10.
!d.
!d.
!d. There Wa$ a notion that "[the bees] were demonically possessed or would not have
have committed the crime .... " !d.
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Little or no consideration was given to the guilt or innocence of the
owner of the tree, the well or the bee hive. 135 The guilt, therefore,
attached to the guilty thing which had allegedly done the wrongful act. 136
This guilt provided the basis for the theory that an object which caused an
accident, whether an animal or a tree, was thereby tainted. 137 These principles formed the legal foundation that disregards a property owner's innocence as an irrelevant consideration. 138 And as societies continued to
develop, so did the idea that those in authority should receive compensation from the owners of guilty objects. 139
By the eighteenth century, however, situations involving deodands
were still uncommon in America. 140 Even so, the doctrine of deodands
established that owners of "guilty" property were properly punishable
because forfeiture inspired better care by the property owner. 141 In fact,
William Blackstone, a well-known legal analyst, believed that events
leading to accidental death, were in part, a result of the property owner's
negligence. 142 However, "[t]he notion that deodands could be justified as
an inducement to better care or as a deterrent to negligence continued
until the frequency of deaths from accident revealed its emptiness." 143
The increase of accidental deaths and the law's failure to provide redress for victims' families forced Parliament to create an alternative to
the deodand. 144 The Parliament thus decided to eliminate deodands and
vest a cause of action in victims' survivors. 145 By 1846, deodands were
abolished in England without ever entering the mainstream of American
law. 146 The basic theories supporting deodands, however, established the
foundation of current civil forfeiture law in the United States. 147
In examining the personification of guilty objects, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the law attributes "to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong. In such cases

135. Levy, supra note 19, at 10.
J 36. ld.; Hyde, supra note 2, at 18.
137. Id. During the middle ages, animals could be subjected to capital punishment if
"convicted" of a crime. Levy, supra note 19, at 11. Ecclesiastical courts of the medieval church
tried accused animals as if they were rational creatures. In some instances, animals would be
dressed up in human clothing before a death sentence was imposed. The persecution of these
animals was a symbolic gesture to appease the victim and God. Jd.
138. Levy, supra note 19, at 10.
139. Jd. at 11.
140. !d. at 14. The rarity of deodands may have been attributed to the colonists' reluctance
to make the crown the beneficiary of the deodands. Id.
141. Levy, supra note 19, at 15.
142. /d.
143. /d. at 17.
144. ld. at 18.
145. /d. at 19.
146. !d.
147. /d. at 19.
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there is some analogy to the law of deodand by which a personal chattel
that was the immediate cause of the death of any reasonable creature was
forfeited." 148 Inanimate objects have been forfeited under the theory that
the object is guilty of the wrongdoing. 149 For example, in United States v.
One 1963 Cadillac Coup de Ville Two Door, 150 the government sued a
Cadillac Coup de Ville as though the vehicle itself were guilty of a
crime. 151 Similarly, in United States v. One 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano
Military Rifle, 152 the government sued the firearm used in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy under the theory that the ri11e was a
species of a deodand. 153
B.

Admiralty Cases: Pirating

Admiralty law covers maritime matters that relate to commercial sea
traffic and navigation, and is rooted in the English fiction which personifies inanimate objects with life and personal responsibility. 154 Admiralty
law is also considered "the immediate wellspring of American civil asset
forfeiture law and procedure." 155 Because American civil forfeiture law
was influenced by the maritime law of England, civil forfeitures in America require the use of admiralty law in forfeiture cases. 156 Admiralty cases
that influenced civil forfeitures in America have been well documented,
most notably by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who long ago stated that
a ship may be the most living of inanimate things because everyone assigns a gender to vessels. 157 In addition, Justice Holmes rationalized his
position:
[t]he ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners,
and rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy
abroad in strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy
the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to get their indemnity as they may be able. 158

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
(5th Cir.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

!d. at 8.
!d.
250 F. Supp. 183, 185 (1996).
Levy, supra note 19, at 7.
250 F. Suw. 410 (N.D. Tex), rev'd sub nom. King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235, 236
1966).
Levy, supra note 19, at 7.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 20.
ld.
!d.
!d. at 21.
!d. at 22.
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The United States Supreme Court addressed civil forfeiture under
admiralty law in The Palmyra. 159 The Palmyra, which was a private
armed vessel, had allegedly attacked a United States ship and the citizens
on board, resulting in the death of one man and the injury of six others. 160
Subsequent to this confrontation, the Palmyra was captured by the United
States vessel, the Grampus. 161 After the Palmyra was captured, she was
sent to a Charleston, South Carolina port where a libel action was filed,
alleging that the Palmyra committed acts of piratical aggression. 162
The United States Attorney General alleged that the Palmyra was not
commissioned lawfully or regularly, and was therefore a piratical vessel. 163 The attorney general further contended that the seizure was fully
justified for three reasons: 1) the Palmyra had committed acts of piratical
aggression; 2) the Palmyra searched American ships in violation of a
treaty between the United States and Spain; and 3) the captain of the Palmyra gave unsatisfactory explanations for these suspicious
circumstances. 164
Counsel for the Palmyra asserted that the charges of piratical aggression were not made with sufficient precision. 165 The Palmyra characterized the situation as a hostile attack by a United States vessel of war
against a foreign vessel which was known to be regularly
commissioned. 166 Counsel further contended that the Palmyra was captured even after the vessel's character had been satisfactorily
explained. 167
The District Court of South Carolina restored the Palmyra to its owners, but denied damages. 168 Both parties appealed this decision to the Cir-

159. 25 U.S. 1 (1827). The Palmyra wa~ decided under an act of Congress which sought to
protect United States conm1erce and to punish piracy. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
160. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 1-2.
161. !d. at 2.
162. !d. The act~ of "piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, and seizure had been
attempted and made upon the high seas in and pon [sic] . . . the United States vessels, the
Coquette and the Jeune Eugenie, and upon vessels of various other nations." ld. When the Palmyra
was captured, the Palmyra was armed with cannons, cannonades, and a one hundred man crew.
!d. at 3.
163. ']be Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 4. The Palmyra, an armed vessel, was originally commissioned
by the King of Spain; when it' commission expired, the vessel's commission wa~ renewed for three
additional months by the Port Captain of Porto Rico, not by the King of Spain. ld. The Attorney
General for the United States argued that "a commission to cruise is a delegated authority, and can
only pr,>eeed h·om the sovereign. Subordinate agents may be employed to execute the will of the
sovere1gn in that respect, but the actual delegation of the power must clearly appear." !d. 'The
Attorney General thus contended that the extension granted by the lieutenant was without the
proper authority from the king, making it a piratical vessel. !d.
164. !d. at 6.
165. ld. at 7.
166. !d.
167. !d.
168. Jd. at 8.
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cuit Court of South Carolina which reversed in part and affirmed in part
the district court's decision. 169 After the circuit court returned the
Palmyra to its owners and awarded $10,288 in damages, both parties filed
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 170 The Supreme Court aftlrmed the circuit court's restoration of the Palmyra to its owners, but
denied damages. 171 Justice Joseph Story, writing for the majority,
explained that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offence [sic] is attached primarily to the thing." 172
Seventeen years later, the United States Supreme Court again referred
to the guilt or innocence of the vessel, rather than that of the owner. 173 A
United States vessel of war seized the Malek Adhel based on reports that
the Malek Adhel was stopping ships and engaging in piratical aggression
and sea robbery. 174 The Malek Adhel was subsequently sent to a Baltimore, Maryland port for adjudication and forfeiture proceedings. 175 The
case of Harmony v. United States 116 resulted when the ship's owner, Peter
Harmony protested the seizure of his ship, the Malek Adhel. 177 Harmony
maintained, and the United States conceded, that Harmony neither contemplated nor authorized the acts of the Malek Adhel' s captain. 178
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland condenmed the vessel, but restored the cargo to the owners. 179 Both parties
then appealed the district court's decision directly to the United States
Supreme Court. 180 The United States Attorney General argued that the

169. Id. at 8-9.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id. at 18. The United States Supreme Court noted that no damages are to be awarded
to a vessel brought into port on charges of piratical aggression. Id. at 6. While a final claim of
damages had been submitted; the clerk of the circuit court failed to transmit an accurate record.
/d. at 9. The United States Supreme Court originally dismissed the claim because no final claim
of damages had been submitted, but reinstated the claim after it was discovered. !d. at 3. The
Justices of the Supreme Court were divided in opinion, and thus, "according to the known practice
of the Court ... ," the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decree of acquittal. Id. at 15.
172. /d. at 14.
173. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 227 (1844).
174. Id. at 211.
175. Id. On June 30, 1840, the Malek Adhel sailed from New York to California, and was
commanded by Joseph Nunez. Id. at 210. The vessel, armed with a cannon, ammunition, pistols,
and daggers, stopped vessels on the high seas. Id. at 210-211. On August 21, 1840, the Malek
Adhel was seized by the Enterprise, a United States vessel of war under an act of Congress
designed to protect commerce and punish piracy. Id. at 211.
176. 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
177. Id. at 211.
178. Id. The United States admitted that the equipment on board the Malek qualified as the
usual equipment necessary for the voyage on which the Malek embarked. Id.
179. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211.
180. !d. at 229. Additional evidence was given in the form of a deposition, which was
corroborated by two different persons. !d. at 212. The witness, John Meyer, gave an account of
the voyage, highlighting Captain Nunez's bizarre and belligerent behavior. !d. at 212-13. Several
circumstances included the captain instructing his crew not to speak English to any crew member
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Malek Adhel' s action..<; were piratical under an Act of Congress of March
3, 1819. 181 Harmony maintained that the acts complained of were not piratical in nature and, even if the ship was brought within the scope of the
act, the vessel should not have been condemned because he never participated in or authorized such piratical acts. 182
The Supreme Court condemned the vessel, but restored the cargo to
the owner, holding that the act does not address the property owner, but
rather the guilt of the vessel or thing. 183 In fact, according to the act, the
only facts required to be proven were that the Malek Adhel was an armed
vessel, and that she committed a piratical aggression. 184 In fact, the Supreme Court noted that if Congress intended to create an exception for
innocent owners, it would have left the courts with some discretion. 185
The Supreme Court stated that because Congress did not leave the courts
with this discretion, it did not intend to provide an exception for innocent
owners. 186
The Supreme Court further noted that, although it is inequitable to
punish an innocent owner, the court must adhere to Congress' goal of
destroying the means used to facilitate crime. 187 The Supreme Court concluded that "the acts of the master and crew ... bind the interest of the
owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture .... " 188
C.

Contraband Cases: Manufacturing

In an illegal manufacturing case, the United States Supreme Court
again articulated that a civil forfeiture was aimed at the object instead of
the property owner. 189 In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 190 a property owner leased his premises to a lessee in order to operate a distillery.191 The lessee was subsequently charged with failing to keep the required accounting records, making false entries with intent to defraud the

of the Sullivan, an approaching ship. ld. at 213. After an exchange with the Sullivan, the Malek
Adhel then sailed away and fired a shot at her. /d.
181. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211-12.
182. ld. at 230.
183. !d. at 227.
184. /d.
185. Jd.
186. /d. at 227. Although it might seem unjust to "punish the innocent for the guilty ... the
object of Congress was to stop the crime by breaking up the means of committing it." ld.
187. ld. at 227.
188. ld. at 234.
189. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 403 (1877).
190. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
191. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 395.
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government of taxes, and refusing to produce records when requested. 192
Although the property owner maintained his ignorance of the lessee's tax
evading activities, an order of condemnation was nevertheless entered by
the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa against the property owner and
the lessee. 193 The circuit court held that it was unnecessary to prove that
the owner was aware of the crime in order for the seizure to be proper. 194
The circuit court further stated that if one knowingly rents one's property
to a wrongdoer, then one must suffer the consequences of the law. 195 As
support for this statement, the circuit court reasoned that an owner impliedly submits to the consequences of the law if his property is used illegally because "the law places him on the same footing as if he were the
distiller. .. " 196 The property owner subsequently filed a writ of error and
removed the action to the United States Supreme Court. 197
On appeal, the property owner argued that the circuit court erred by
instructing the jury that they were not required to find that the owner was
implicated in the lessee's activities in order to return a verdict for the
government. 198 The United States Supreme Court noted, however, that the
property owner "appear[ed] to have assumed, as the theory of the defence
[sic] to the information, that he was the accused party and that he was on
trial." 199 The Supreme Court further stated that the information was not
aimed at the property owner, but rather at the distillery, stating that "the
offence [sic] ... is attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and
personal property in connection with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner. " 200
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that condemnation of the distillery
was proper. 201

D.

Contraband Cases: Transporting

Two courts have addressed civil forfeiture law as it applies to the
transportation of contraband in automobiles. 202 In J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co. v. United States, 203 for example, the Grant Company sold a

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
19 8.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

!d. at 396.
!d. at 395, 397.
!d. at 399.
!d.
!d. at 399.
!d. at 397.
!d. at 398.
!d. at 399.
!d. at 401.
!d. at 404.
See infra notes 203-232 and accompanying text.
254 u.s. 505 (1921).
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Hudson automobile to a taxicab driver, J.G. Thompson, but retained title
to the vehicle as security for the unpaid balance. 204 When J. G. Thompson
was caught transporting moonshine, the taxicab was seized, even though
the Grant Company was unaware of the purchaser's criminal activity. 205
The Grant Company challenged the forfeiture as a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 206 In the District Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Georgia, the jury concluded
that the automobile, in essence, was itself the guilty thing. 207 As a result
of the jury's verdict, the district court ordered the automobile's seizure. 208
The district court denied the Grant Company's motion for a new trial, and
the Grant Company subsequently appealed. 209
On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that "whether the reason for . . . the
challenged forfeiture scheme be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced."210 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the owner had
entrusted the property to the wrongdoer, the owner was partly responsible
and thus properly punishable. 211 Consequently, the Supreme Court held
that "[i ]t is the illegal use that is the material consideration . . . the guilt
or innocence of its owner being accidenta1."212 Thus, the Supreme Court
held that because the automobile was used to facilitate the crime, it was
the proper object of condemnation. 213
The United States Supreme Court also addressed civil forfeiture in
another case applying to automobiles. 214 In Van Oster v. United States, 215
Stella Van Oster purchased an automobile from a local car dealer in
Finney County, Kansas. 216 As partial consideration for the purchase, Ms.
Van Oster permitted the car dealer to retain the automobile for use in the
dealership. 217 Clyde Brown, an associate of the car dealer, was frequently
permitted to use the automobile. 218 Ms. Van Oster was aware of Brown's

204. J.W. Gold~mith, Jr.-Grant Co., v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 508-509 (1921).
205. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 509.
206. ld.
207. ld.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511. (citations omitted).
211. ld. (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 513.
213. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court did, however, reserve opinion
on whether the "guilty" object theory may be extended to stolen property or property taken without
the owner's consent. Id. at 512.
214. Van Oster v. United States, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
215. ld.
216. ld. at 465-466.
217. ld.
218. ld. at 466.
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use of the automobile, but unaware of any illegal activity accompanying
that use. 219 When Brown was arrested and charged with illegally transporting intoxicating liquor in the car, the State sought the forfeiture and
sale of the automobile. 220 Ms. Van Oster intervened in the forfeiture action, arguing that her interest in the vehicle should not have been
forfeited because she was unaware of the automobile's criminal use. 221
The District Court of Kansas nevertheless entered an order of forfeiture.222 Ms. Van Oster appealed this holding to the Kansas Supreme
Court. 223
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision. 224 The supreme court stated that the Kansas civil forfeiture statute authorized the seizure of an innocent owner's property if it was entrusted to a lawbreaker. 225 Ms. Van Oster maintained that this interpretation of the statute violated rights conferred to her under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 226 The supreme court rejected Ms.
Van Oster's argument, reasoning that the state may exercise its police
powers to seize property used in violation of Kansas' laws. 227 According
to the supreme court, the forfeiture was constitutional in this case, despite
Ms. Van Oster's lack of knowledge. 228 Ms. Van Oster filed a writ of error
to the United States Supreme Court. 229
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted that because the
car was misused by the seller, the forfeiture was proper. 230 Ms. Van Oster
maintained that the car's criminal use was without her knowledge or consent. 231 The Supreme Court rejected her argument, holding that no significant basis supported Ms. Van Oster's constitutional challenge to the forfeiture. 232

219. Id.
220. /d. The State sought the forfeiture of the automobile as a common nuisance. /d.
221. /d. at 465-466.
222. /d.
223. /d.
224. /d. at 466. The Kansas Supreme Court stated, however, that because the legislature
sought to effectuate a purpose within its power, this civil forfeiture was within the limits of due
process. /d. at 468.
225. /d. at 466.
226. /d.
227. Id. at 467.
228. /d. at 467.
229. /d. at 466.
230. /d.
231. /d.
232. /d. at 469.
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Rejection of the Innocent Owner's Defense

The innocent owner defense has been uniformly rejected by modern
American courts adjudicating civil forfeiture cases. 233 In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 234 for example, a pleasure yacht was seized
after the lessees were arrested for transporting controlled substances. 235
The yacht company challenged the seizure, asserting that it was unaware
of the lessee's criininal use of the yacht. 236 The yacht company further
contended that it was unaware of the yacht's seizure, until it attempted to
repossess the yacht because of past due rent. 237
The United States District Court held that the Puerto Rican statute
permitting forfeiture under the circumstances was unconstitutional because the yacht company was unaware of the criminal conduct which had
triggered the seizure. 238 The district court also held that the forfeiture statute unconstitutionally authorized the governmental taking of an innocent
person's property without just compensation. 239 When the district court
struck down the statute as unconstitutional, the government appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. 240
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision,
stating that forfeiture furthered punitive and deterrent purposes in this
case, and could withstand the constitutional challenge of an innocent
owner. 241 As support for its decision, the Supreme Court noted that forfeitures were "likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand
tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer. "242
In dicta, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, "it would be difficult
to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."243 The Supreme Court noted that nothing in
the record indicated that the yacht company had done everything that
could reasonably have been expected of it to prevent the illegal use of the

233. See infra notes 234-245 and accompanying text.
234. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
235. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665 (1974).
236. !d. at 668.
237. !d. The government can typically effectuate seizures without affording the owner notice
and an opportunity to object. Cheh, supra note 8, at 1, 2.
238. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669.
239. !d.
240. [d.
241. [d.
242. Id. at 682.
243. ld. at 689-690.
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yacht. 244 Based on this analysis, the Supreme Court reversed the district
court's decision and ordered the condemnation of the pleasure yacht. 245

F. Application of the Excessive Fines Clause to Civil Forfeiture
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to civil forfeiture actions. 246 In Austin v. United States, 247 Richard
Austin was convicted for the possession of narcotics with the intent to
distribute, contrary to South Dakota laws. 248 After Mr. Austin pled guilty
to this charge, the government filed a civil forfeiture action pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) and (a)(7) to seize Mr. Austin's mobile home and
auto body shop. 249 Mr. Austin challenged the forfeiture, alleging that the
seizure was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause. 250
Sioux Falls Police Officer Donald Satterlee signed an affidavit which
connected Mr. Austin's possession of cocaine to his movements between
his mobile home and body shop. 251 Based on the support of this affidavit,
the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted
summary judgment in favor of the government. 252 Mr. Austin appealed
the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. 253
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that "the principle of
proportionality should be applied in civil actions that result in harsh penalties ... and that the government was exacting too high a penalty in rela-

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

!d. at 690.
!d.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993).

!d.
!d. at 603.
!d. at 604.
ld. Chairman Henry Hyde commented that:

[t]here is little or no proportionality between the crimes alleged and the punishment
imposed, raising a question, as the U.S. Supreme Court has now recognized, about what
constitutes "excessive fines" - as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Under asset
forfeiture, hotels have been taken because gangs used them for drug transactions.
Apartment houses have been confiscated because drug deals allegedly took place in
some apartments. Three fraternity houses at the University of Virginia were seized by
local police based on alleged sales of small quantities of drugs by ;"tudent frat members.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 7.
The United States Supreme Court did, however, impose a restriction on the government's forfeiture
power's under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Beaver, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
251. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
252. !d.
253. [d.
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tion to the offense committed."254 Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's decision, Mr. Austin appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. 255
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court sought to resolve the
issue of whether forfeiture was within the purview of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 256 The Supreme Court noted that historically the Eighth Amendment was "intended to prevent the government
from abusing its power to punish."257 Specifically, the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment was designed to limit "the
Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as
punishment for some offense.' " 258
The Supreme Court held that because forfeiture serves as monetary
punishment, "[forfeiture proceedings are] subject to the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."259 Even if the forfeiture
served some remedial purpose, the Court explained, the Eighth Amendment is still implicated if the forfeiture is designed in part to punish the
owner. 260 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that sanctions may
frequently serve multiple purposes. 261 The Supreme Court stated, however, that even if a sanction was partly punitive in nature, the sanction
could still withstand an Eighth Amendment challenge if it was primarily
remedial. 262
The Supreme Court then concluded that forfeiture in general has historically been understood to constitute punishment, and as such is at least
partly subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause. 263 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding
that the forfeiture of Mr. Austin's mobile home and auto body shop was
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause. 264

254. /d. The Eighth Circuit noted "that the penalty imposed was too severe in comparison
to the magnitude of the crime committed, the court could only reach a split decision." !d.
255. /d. at 604-605.
256. /d. at 605.
257. /d.
258. /d. at 606.
259. /d. at 603.
260. /d.
261. /d.
262. Calero, 416 U.S. at 686.
263. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 602.
264. Id. at 622.
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G. Modern Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture is a desirable tool for law enforcement agencies because it is quick, easy, and highly profitable. 265 On a mere showing of
probable cause, property may be seized if it constitutes the proceeds of a
crime or is intended for use in a criminal project. 266
1.

The current burden of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings

In order to seize property in a civil forfeiture action, the government
is required to demonstrate that "probable cause" exists. 267 Oftentimes, in
order to effectuate a civil forfeiture, law enforcement officials rely upon
probable cause that is "mere rumor, gossip, a police hunch, or self-serving statements from anonymous paid police informants, from criminals
cooperating in order to obtain a lighter sentence on pending charges, or
from incarcerated convicts trying to shorten an existing jail term." 268 After demonstrating that probable cause exists to seize the property, the burden of proof shifts to the owner of the seized property. 269 The property
owner must then prove, by a "preponderance of the evidence," that the
accused property was not used in a criminal act. 270
2.

Counsel for indigent property owners

Although the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in a criminal proceeding for indigent parties who cannot afford an attorney, no
such right extends to indigent parties in civil forfeiture actions. 271 Under

265.
266.
another,

Cheh, supra note 8, at 1, 3.

Id. Civil forfeiture may be predicated on probable cause when one person says to

"that guy Smith looks like he does drugs. An informant overhears this idle gossip and
reports it to the police, who in turn seize Smith's residence and start forfeiture
proceedings. No drugs are found and Smith is never arrested or charged with a crime
yet. Smith is forced to hire a lawyer and fight in court to get his house back - and
he and his family, may well be evicted."
Hyde, supra note 2, at 57.
Probable cause is defined as "having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for
belief in certain alleged facts. A set of probabilities grounded in the factual and practical
considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more than
mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
267. Hyde, supra note 2, at 6. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as "evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition
to it; that is, evidence which a~ a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable
than not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
268. Hyde, supra note 2, at 7.
269. Id.
270. /d.
271. ld. at 8.
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current civil forfeiture procedures, a property owner who cannot afford
an attorney to contest an improper seizure by the government is simply
"out of luck."272 Representative Elvin Martinez, a member of the Florida
House of Representatives, has commented that police administrators in
Florida have "corrupted [civil forfeiture's] legislative purpose and were
instead using it to harass innocent owners with little or no financial or
other ability to defend themselves. " 273
Statistics support Representative Martinez's view, demonstrating that
"the vast majority of forfeitures involve the property of average citizens
caught in the clutches of this draconian law and its too-eager
enforcers." 274 For example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")
released figures for the eighteen months preceding December 1990 showing that only seventeen percent of the 25,297 property items seized by the
DEAhad a value of over $50,000. 275 Such statistics "speak volumes about
the targets-and victims-of this law."276
3.

Civil forfeiture as a crime-fighting mechanism

Until the 1980's, the government rarely resorted to the civil forfeiture
of private property. 277 Since then, however, civil forfeiture has been frequently used as "a weapon in the arsenal of the drug war."278 Currently,
more than one hundred federal forfeiture statutes exist which address
both criminal and civil matters. 279
Civil forfeiture, however, can be distinguished from criminal forfeiture. 28 ° Civil forfeiture is utilized to seize the property of a person not
involved in a crime whereas criminal forfeiture seizes the property of the
lawbreaker: 281
[Criminal forfeiture] arises under criminal statutes that allow in
personam actions against a named criminal defendant. In such
cases, forfeiture comes about subsequent to and as a punitive
consequence of the defendant's conviction for specific criminal
acts, usually as a supplement to other statutory punishment including possible incarceration or tines .... The important differ-

272. Id.
273. Id. at 10-11.
274. Id. at 11.
275. !d.
276. !d.
277. Id. at 23.
278. !d.
279. /d.
280. /d. at 21.
281. !d.
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ence in this procedure compared to civil forfeiture, is that criminal forfeiture occurs, at least in theory, only after a trial of the
defendant at which full constitutional and procedural safeguards
of due process apply. No convictions; no forfeiture. No wrongdoing; no property confiscation. The issue at trial is the individual's
misconduct, not the fictional guilt of an inanimate object, as in
civil forfeiture cases. 282
Thus, an arrest and conviction of the property owner is not required to
effectuate a civil forfeiture of personal property. 283
H. A Proposal for Civil Forfeiture Reform
On June 15, 1993, United States Congressman and Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee Henry Hyde (R-IL) introduced a bill entitled
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993 ("CAPRA") to the House
of Representatives. 284 Chairman Hyde also introduced the bill to the
House Judiciary Committee and to the House Ways and Means Committee on June 22, 1995. 285 Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation seeks to
reform certain statutes governing civil forfeiture. 286 United States Senator
James Jefford (R-VT) introduced an identical version of this bill in the
Senate. 287 In support of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Senator
Jefford stated that, "[t]he terms of the bill are relatively simple, and its
objectives are modest at best."288

1.

Procedural reform

Procedurally, Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation notably differs
from existing civil forfeiture statutes. 289 For example, under current law, a
property owner has ten days to file a claim in a civil forfeiture proceeding.290 Under CAPRA, however, the current time limit would be extended
to sixty days. 291 Additionally, under the current system, owners of seized

282. !d. In personam is defined as '"[a)gainst the person." BLACK'S LAW DrcnoNARY 791
(6th ed. 1990). In personam is an '"[a]ction seeking judgment against a person involving his
personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his
person, as distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e. in rem)." !d.
283. Hyde, supra note 2, at 26.
284. Levy, supra note 19, at 210.
285. See generally H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995).
286. !d. CAPRA would apply to all claims brought on or subsequent to the enactment of the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 9 (1995).
287. Levy, supra note 19, at 210.
288. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1139.
289. See infra notes 290-309 and accompanying text.
290. Levy, supra note 19, at 212.
291. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
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property must provide a bond worth ten percent of the value of the confiscated property in order to obtain the right to contest the forfeiture. 292
CAPRA would completely eliminate this bond requirement. 293
Under current law, the government is permitted to commence civil
forfeiture proceedings, but remains exempt from any liability resulting
from damage inflicted on the property during the seizure. 294 This exemption would be eliminated under CAPRA, allowing innocent victims of
civil forfeiture to hold the government liable for damage done to their
property while in the government's possession. 295 Currently, seized property will not be returned to the property owner unless a court adjudicates
that the seizure was improper, regardless of whether the seizure creates a
financial hardship for the property owner. 296 CAPRA would permit
courts, on a demonstration of "substantial hardship," to temporarily return seized property to the owner while a final judicial resolution is pending. 297
2.

Altering the burden of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings

Under current law, the burden of proof rests with property owners to
demonstrate that their property has not been utilized in the commission of
a crime, and as such is not seizable under civil forfeiture statutes. 298 Under this burden, "[t]he law reverses the normal presumption of innocence,
presuming the property 'guilty' unless the owner can prove otherwise."299
CAPRA, however, would alter the current burden of proof, placing the
burden on the government to prove that the property was properly
seized. 300
Additional differences exist between current forfeiture law and
Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation. 301 For example, under CAPRA,
the government would be required to demonstrate that the seizure of the
property was lawful by "clear and convincing evidence," rather than by
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard currently required of a
property owner. 302 Under the clear and convincing standard proposed by

292. Levy. supra note 19, at 212. This bond, however, must not be less than $250 or more
than $5000, and is used to cover court and storage costs in case the government wins. /d.
293. Td.
294. /d.
295. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
296. Levy, supra note 19, at 212.
297. !d. at 212-13.
298. Hyde, supra note 2, at 55.
299. /d.
300. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 615 (1995).
301. See infra notes 302-309 and accompanying text.
302. H.R. 1916 104th Cong. § 615 (1995). Clear and convincing proof can be defined as
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Chairman Hyde, "[t]he government would be required to prove (1) that
the unlawful act on which the forfeiture is based actually did occur and
(2) that a sufficient nexus exists between the property to be seized and the
alleged unlawful act." 303 A clear and convincing standard would provide
that these two requirements be satisfied before a seizure could be considered proper. 304

3.

Court-appointed representation

Currently, a property owner has no constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in a civil forfeiture proceeding. 305 Thus, a property owner
who is financially unable to obtain legal representation may be unable to
contest a forfeiture. 306 Consequently, indigent property owners may be
forced to forfeit their property, regardless of whether their property was
improperly seized. 307 In contrast, CAPRA would provide court-appointed
counsel to represent indigent property owners who claim that the forfeiture of their property was improper. 308 In addition to providing court-appointed counsel, CAPRA would require that such counsel be compensated from the Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund. 309
IV. ANALYSIS
When John Bennis was arrested for his acts of gross indecency inside
the Bennis family car, the state initiated a civil forfeiture action and
seized the automobile. 310 Tina Bennis claimed that her property interest in
the automobile should not have been forfeited because she was unaware
of her husband's criminal activities. 311 However, the Michigan District
Court determined that the automobile could be seized because it constituted an abatable nuisance. 312 Tina Bennis appealed the district court's
decision. 313

"[t]hat proof which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy."
BlACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
Petitioner
312.
313.

Hyde, supra note 2, at 59.
!d.
!d. at 81.
!d.
!d. at 59.
H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 608 (1995).

!d.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.

!d. at 997. A commentator has suggested that there has never been a more sympathetic
to come before the United States Supreme Court. Savage, supra note 33, at 47.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct.. at 997.
Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
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On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision, holding that the civil forfeiture of the automobile was
improper. 314 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
affirmed the district court's decision, and noted that the Bennis family car
was an abatable nuisance as a matter of law. 315 Tina Bennis subsequently
appealed the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to the United States
Supreme Court. 316 The United States Supreme Court rejected Tina
Bennis' constitutional challenges, and approved the forfeiture of the automobi1e.317

A The Development of Civil Forfeiture Law As Applicable to Bennis
I.

Focusing on the property, not the property owner

The law of civil forfeiture, like the law of deodands, focuses on the
property of the owner, not the owner's guilt or innocence. 318 For example,
in The Palmyra, 319 the United States Supreme Court rejected the property
owners' assertion that they were innocent, holding that "the thing" is the
primary offender and that the offense is attached to "the thing. " 320 In addition, the United States Supreme Court addressed the innocent owner
defense in Harmony v. United States. 321 Although the government conceded that Mr. Harmony never contemplated or authorized the criminal
acts of the vessel's captain, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the
law does not focus on the property owner, but rather on the guilt of the
vessel or thing. 322
2.

Labeling the object as the "guilty" thing

Historical precedent controlling civil forfeiture is grounded in the
need to punish and deter piracy as demonstrated in the cases of The Palmyra313 and Harmony v. United States. 324 In both cases, vessels were
seized because of piratical aggression. 325 Under the theory that the vessel,

314. Bennts, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
315. /d. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals assertion that in order
to ahate an automobile, the state must prove that the owner consented to the criminal use of the
vehicle. /d.
316. !d. at 997.
317. /d. at 1000-01.
318. Levy, supra note 19, at 17, 19.
319. 25 U.S. l (1827).
320. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14.
321. 43 u.s. 210, 233 (1844).
322. /d.
323. 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
324. 43 U.S. at 229.
325. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 1; Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229.

209]

PIRACY TO PROSTITUTION

241

as well as the individual directing the vessel, helped facilitate the crime
of piracy, the court in Harmony found that once the vessel was seized, its
captain could no longer engage in piratical aggression. 326 As the United
States Supreme Court noted in The Palmyra, "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily
to the thing. " 327
In The Palmyra and Harmony, the vessels were seized irrespective of
the owner's innocence. 328 However, rational reasons supported this forfeiture, because in those times a ship could travel halfway around the world
to escape the then limited reach of justice. 329 The owners, falsely claiming
they were ignorant of any criminal activity, could then continue to pirate
with impunity. 330 In Bennis, however, an automobile does not facilitate
the crime of soliciting prostitution in the same manner as a vessel facilitates piratical aggression. 331 Nor was the car a "necessary element" of the
crime in Bennis; in fact, the solicitation could have occurred anywhere. 332
Unlike the captains in Harmony or The Palmyra, John Bennis did not
need a car to perpetrate his criminal act. 333
Similar to the admiralty cases, the United States Supreme Court addressed the need for civil forfeiture when the use of real property constituted an element of the crime. 334 For example, in Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 335 the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of an illegally
operated distillery because it constituted an element of the crime. 336 In
Bennis, however, the operation of the car did not constitute an element of
the crime, as the operation of the distillery did in Dobbins's Distillery. 337
Because no direct correlation existed between the crime of solicitation of
prostitution and the operation of a motor vehicle, the forfeiture of the
Bennis car would not prevent John Bennis' crime from recurring. 338

326. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34.
327. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. The United States Supreme Court in The Palmyra
acknowledged that it is unfair to punish the innocent, but relied on Congress' significant goal of
destroying the means to facilitate crime. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted).
328. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 17; Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211.
329. See supra notes 154-188 and accompanying text.
330. !d.
331. See supra notes 91-94, 323-327 and accompanying text.
332. !d.
333. !d.
334. See infra notes 323-333; 335-338 and accompanying text.
335. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
336. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 394, 404 (1877).
337. See supra notes 91-94, 189-201 and accompanying text.
338. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1004, 1007 (1996).
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Rejecting the innocent owner's defense and justifying civil forfeiture

In the past seventy-five years, courts have continually rejected property owner's assertions that they should be insulated against forfeiture
through an innocent owner's defense. 339 In both J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co. v. United States 340 and Van Oster v. Kansas, 341 vehicles were
forfeited for illegally transporting moonshine. 342 Similarly, in Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 343 a leased yacht was forfeited when
the lessee was caught transporting controlled substances. 344 In all three
cases, the property owners challenged the forfeiture on constitutional
grounds because they lacked knowledge of the criminal acts. 345
In Goldsmith-Grant, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
because the car was used to facilitate the crime, it was a proper object of
forfeiture, regardless of the property owner's innocence. 346 Moreover, the
Supreme Court held that the car was properly confiscated because the
forfeiture prevented the recurrence of the crime. 347 Similarly, the automobile in Bennis was forfeited, however, transportation was not an element
of the crime and forfeiture would not have prevented the crime from recurring.348 In fact, John Bennis was sighted in the area reputed for prostitution on two prior occasions; neither incident involved the use of the
family car. 349 As Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion, "[a]n isolated misuse of a stationary vehicle should not justify the
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property on the theory that it constituted
an instrumentality of the crime. " 350
In Calera-Toledo, the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta
that a constitutional challenge by an innocent owner would be difficult to
disregard when his or her property had been seized under the civil forfeiture statutes if that owner was entirely without culpability and had taken
reasonable precautions to prevent the criminal activity. 351 Such dicta implicitly:

339. See infra notes 340- 355 and accompanying text.
340. 254 u.s. 505 (1921).
341. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
342. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466; J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 508.
343. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
344. /d.
345. See supra notes 203-245 and accompanying text.
346. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co, 254 U.S. at 512-13.
347. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 334-338 and accompanying text. Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court noted that Congress' intentions were to condemn the interests of guilty individuals,
not to foJteit the property of a guiltless owner. J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510.
349. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007.
350. !d. at 1005.
351. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90.
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recognizes that where the forfeiture statute at issue serves punitive purposes, the State may not forfeit property on the basis of
its misuse by another person, unless the owner had some culpability at least amounting to negligence in connection with the
unlawful use. The principle implicit in the dicta-that the State
has no legitimate interest in punishing one who is entirely innocent .... 352
The Court in Bennis nevertheless followed its "long and unbroken line"
of precedent, failing to consider what is regarded as "logic, equity, or the
practical needs of a modern society." 353 Although a "long and unbroken
line" of cases involving civil forfeiture remains, Bennis is neither a lineal
descendant nor first cousin to the historical precedent relied upon by the
majority. 354 Moreover, the doctrine of deodands, similar to the doctrine of
civil forfeiture, "was a tissue of legal fictions and contradictions. It was
also unjust to its core. " 355
B. Adopting the Bennis Dissent's Analysis
Throughout American history, automobiles have been seized when
transportation was a factor facilitating the criminal offense, such as the
transportation of moonshine or controlled substances. 356 In Bennis, however, the automobile bears no rational relationship to the crime committed; indeed, although the crime occurred in the automobile, the Bennis
family car was not necessary to effectuate the crime. 357
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion that the character of the neighborhood in which
the criminal offense occurred justified seizing the car as a contribution to
an ongoing "nuisance condition."358 Based on this theory, Justice Stevens
concluded that the very same car, parked in a more affluent neighborhood
in suburban Detroit, would not be subject to forfeiture. 359 Thus, Justice
Stevens criticized the notion that these same criminal acts would not create an "ongoing nuisance condition" in a distinguished neighborhood. 360

352. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
353. Hyde, supra note 2, at 71.
354. Id; See supra notes 310-353 and accompanying text.
355. Levy, supra note 19, at 19.
356. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
357. /d.
358. /d. at 1006 n.9. It is difficult to confiscate real property when there is no real
connection between the crime and the property. /d. (citations omitted).
359. /d. at 1006 n.9. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
360. /d.
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Justice Stevens also questioned the State's argument that the forfeiture was not punitive because the goal of this forfeiture was to abate a
nuisance. 361 Although the majority conceded that the forfeiture, at least in
part, punished the innocent owner, Justice Stevens maintained that the
principal aim of the forfeiture was punishment. 362 Even assuming that
forfeiture may occasionally serve a remedial end by deterring future criminal conduct, forfeiture of the Bennis car would not have prevented a reoccurrence of this criminal act. 363 As John Bennis' behavior
demonstrates, this crime could have been committed anywhere. 364 In fact,
witnesses testified at trial that John Bennis was seen at least twice during
the previous summer soliciting prostitutes on foot without the use of
car.365
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that because the principal aim of the
forfeiture was punitive, the majority erred in affirming the Michigan Supreme Court. 366 Justice Stevens asserted that Tina Bennis had done nothing to warrant such punishment. 367 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens argued that the forfeiture of the Bennises automobile was an arbitrary deprivation of an innocent woman's property without due process of
law. 368 Thus, the state utilized its forfeiture powers to arbitrarily and inequitably confiscate Tina Bennis' property interest in the Bennis family
car. 369

C. Justice Stevens' Three Category Approach
In his dissenting opinion in Bennis, Justice Stevens stated that property subject to forfeiture can be divided into three separate categories:
"pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, and tools of the criminal
trade.'mo The first category, pure contraband, covers objects where mere
possession would amount to a per se criminal violation. 371 Examples include smuggled goods, narcotics, and adulterated food. 372 The Bennis car,

361. Id.
362. ld. at 1006-7.
363. ld. at 1007.
364. Id.
365. Id. Under this nuisance analysis, the car would no longer be considered a nuisance once
it leaves the neighborhood. Id. at 1006 n.9.
366. !d. at 1009-10. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
367. ld. at 1009.
368. ld.
369. See supra notes 384-388 and accompanying text.
370. ld.
371. ld.
372. ld. The Government has a remedial interest in removing these items from circulation
because they are dangerous or harmful. ld.
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however, does not fit into the first category because the mere possession
of an automobile is not a crime. 373
The second category, proceeds of criminal activity, historically has
denoted stolen property. 374 However, federal statutes have dramatically
broadened this category to enable the government to seize money earned
through criminal means. 375 Examples include a piece of property
purchased with drug money or an asset acquired through the means of
embezzlement. 376 However, the Bennis family car was not purchased by
such ill-gotten gains. 377
The third category, instrumentalities utilized in the commission of a
crime, includes items such as yachts, airplanes, and automobiles. 378 Typically, the government has difficulty justifying forfeitures for items not
utilized in the commission of a crime because the remedial interest in
confiscation is less obvious. 379 For example, the early cases involving
civil forfeiture primarily targeted pirate ships engaged in trading slaves
and smuggling goods. 380 As a result, the forfeiture of these vessels was
approved by the courts, regardless of whether the owner knew of the
criminal activity. 381 Thus, under admiralty law, the ship itself was considered the offender. 382 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized
the majority's application of admiralty cases to the Bennis case because
the law demonstrated in the case precedent presumes that an owner is
aware of the principal use of his property. 383
Tina Bennis, however, testified that she was completely unaware of
any criminal use of the Pontiac by her husband. 384 In fact, she expected
him to "come directly home from work," as was his normal routine. 385
When John Bennis failed to come home on the night of his arrest, Tina
Bennis even called "Missing Persons."386 As Tina Bennis' testimony was
uncontradicted and inherently credible, she demonstrated that she was
"[w]ithout knowledge that [John Bennis] would commit such an act in the
family car, or that he had ever done so previously, [and] surely [Tina

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
/d.

!d.
!d.
/d.
/d.

The return of such property has an important "restitutionary justification." !d.
at 1008.
at 1010.
at 1004.
/d. at 1004-1005.
!d. at 1005.
/d.

!d.
!d. at 1008.
/d.
/d.
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Bennis] cannot be accused of failing to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent
the illicit behavior."387 Tina Bennis is as innocent as if a thief had stolen
the Pontiac and used it criminally. 388
D. Austin: The Punishment Should Be Proportionate to the Crime
The United States Supreme Court recently held, in Austin v. United
States, 389 that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies to
civil forfeitures. 390 In Austin, the Supreme Court demonstrated support for
a constitutional limitation on civil forfeiture by acknowledging that forfeiture has historically served to punish the criminally culpable. 391 Further, the Supreme Court recognized that civil forfeiture, in certain circumstances, may be so disproportionate to the crime committed that it
violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 392
In addition, United States Congressman and Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee Henry Hyde (R-IL) has explained that the confiscation of a family home would be disproportionate to the crime committed
when only one family member had stolen items worth less than $500. 393
Using Chairman Hyde's reasoning, the Bennis family car should not have
been confiscated simply because one act of prostitution occurred in the
car. 394
Applying the due process principles articulated in Austin and the rationale asserted by Chairman Hyde, logic would dictate that forfeiture of
the $600 Pontiac was disproportionate and inequitable because it was, in
effect, punishment for Tina Bennis' husband's conduct, of which she was
completely unaware. 395 The forfeiture of Tina Bennis' property interest is
punishment for her husband's conduct; conduct of which she was completely unaware. 396 Although Tina Bennis consented to her husband's use
of the family car to commute to work, that consent is such that "even a
modest penalty is out of all proportion to her blameworthiness; and when
the assessment is the confiscation of the entire car, simply because [one]

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
See supra
396.

!d.
See supra notes 393-397 and accompanying text.
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
!d. at 2803.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-06.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 13.
See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729);
notes 393-397 and accompanying text.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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illicit act took place once in the driver's seat, the punishment is plainly
excessive. " 397
E.

Lack of Fundamental Fairness

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "[f]undamental
fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people. " 398 Fundamental
fairness also militates against the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property. 399 When the majority revisited historical precedent, it held that its
early forfeiture decisions were based on the theory of negligent entrustment. 400 This theory is based on the inference that the owner negligently
allowed the property to be misused. 401 Under this analysis, the majority
stated that the owner is properly punishable through forfeiture for this
negligence. 402 Here, however, the State conceded that Tina Bennis was in
no way negligent in entrusting the family car to John Bennis. 403
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas criticized the majority, noting that if "[i]mproperly used, forfeitures could become more
like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent, but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded
to punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice. " 404 Tina Bennis, as an innocent co-owner whose car was
seized as a result of her husband's criminal acts, experienced the inequities of the roulette wheel phenomenon which concerned Justice
Thomas. 405 In fact, "[civil forfeiture] law today is being used across the
nation to make a mockery of our rights to property and due process and is
now reaching well beyond the war on drugs." 406

F. The Goal Of Civil Forfeiture Reform

1.

Eliminating profitability as the sole motivation for civil forfeiture

Many civil forfeiture actions are now "unrelenting governmental assaults on property rights, fueled by a dangerous and emotional vigilante
mentality that sanctions shredding the U.S. Constitution into meaningless

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

ld.

Id. at 1007.
ld.
Id.
ld.
ld.
Jd.
Id.
ld.

at 1007-08.
at 1007.

at 1003.

(emphasis added) (Thomas, J., concurring).
See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
Hyde, supra note 2, at vii.
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confetti."407 Thus, one of the primary objectives of civil forfeiture reform
should be to stop the '"pillage and plunder' mentality of greed ... " 408
This attitude is a direct result of the "easy money temptation offered by
the current civil asset forfeiture laws. " 409 Under current civil forfeiture
law, the government has the power to confiscate the property of private
citizens, sell it, and retain the proceeds. 410 Through the use of civil forfeiture, the government has devised an unlimited source of revenue which
lacks legislative oversight. 411 Thus, civil forfeiture reform should create
legislative oversight for the seizure of property and the expenditure of
monies retained from the sale proceeds. 412
2.

Rebalancing the scales of justice

The presumption of innocence is one of "the most vital and treasured
tenets of United States criminal law." 413 This presumption is the popular
embodiment of the due process rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. 414 The presumption of innocence has been increasingly undermined by the government's abusive use of civil forfeiture. 415 Under
current civil forfeiture laws, property owners have the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the forfeiture of their property
was improper. 416 Sustaining that burden has proven to be an unreasonable
hardship on property owners. 417 Property owners find it nearly impossible
to produce documentation or other evidence which can demonstrate that
the "property was never used . . . to 'facilitate' the commission of a
crime. " 418 Thus, a property owner is essentially required to prove a negative. 419 This burden, as most property owners have discovered, is nearly
insurmountable. 420

ld. at 1.
ld. at 33.
ld.
ld. at 51-52. The vessel or object which "corrunits the aggression is treated as the
as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without reference
what~oever to the character or conduct of the owner." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 n5. (citations
omitted).
411. Hyde, supra note 2, at 51.
412. See infra notes 444-447 and accompanying text.
413. Levy, supra note 19, at 210-11.
414. ld. at 211.
415. ld.
416. ld.
417. Hyde, supra note 2, at 56.
418. ld.
419. Id.
420. Id. An innocent property owner is faced with "extreme difficulty, if not impossibility
proving such a negative, which the government, as accuser, has easy access to proof of the
property's use in criminal activity-if indeed such proof really does exist." /d.

407.
408.
409.
410.
offender
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As a general rule of American jurisprudence, the burden of proof is
allocated to the party who has the "more easily available means of
proof." 421 Arguably, however, property owners do not have a "more easily available means of proof," because they often do not have the
resources necessary to meet this burden. 422 Thus, the burden of proof unfairly rests on the property owner. 423 This burden should be shifted to the
party who can best shoulder such a burden, the government. 424
Judge C. Arlen Beam of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has commented on the inequitable burden of proof which
rests on property owners. 425 Judge Beam said the following:
The current allocations of burdens and standards of proof require
that the [owner] prove a negative, that the property was not used
in order to facilitate illegal activity, while the government must
prove almost nothing. This creates a great risk of erroneous, irreversible deprivation [of property] .... The allocation of burdens
and standards of proof ... is of great importance because it decides who must go forward with evidence and who bears the risk
of loss should proof not rise to the standard set. In civil forfeiture
cases, where owners are required to go forward with evidence
and exculpate their property by a preponderance of the evidence,
all risks are squarely on the owner. The government, under the
current approach, need not produce any admissible evidence and
may deprive citizens of property based on the rankest of hearsay
and the flimsiest evidence. This result clearly does not reflect the
value of private property in our society, and makes the risk of an
erroneous deprivation intolerable. 426
Thus, civil forfeiture reform is necessary to "rebalance the scales of
Justice" and to protect property owners from governmental abuse. 427 Past
civil forfeiture abuses necessitate the implementation of civil forfeiture
reform which is fair to property owners, yet at the same time preserves
the forfeiture procedures which are necessary to combat criminal activity. 428

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
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G. Implementing Civil Forfeiture Reform
1.

Chairman hyde's civil asset forfeiture reform act ( "CAFRA ")

As Chairman Henry Hyde has noted, the first step in reforming civil
forfeiture "is easily identifiable, a giant step for property rights, a reform
every commentator and relevant interest group has recommended without
exception: shift the burden of evidentiary proof in any judicial proceeding involving forfeiture. " 429 Under CAFRA, the government would be
required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the illegal
conduct on which the forfeiture is premised actually occurred and that a
sufficient nexus exists between the property and the unlawful act. 430 In
addition, CAFRA would standardize the innocent owner's defense, making it easier for property owners to "demonstrate 'either' that [they] did
not know of 'or' consent to the illegal activity." 431
Under current forfeiture procedures, indigent property owners do not
have a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. 432 This omission in
current civil forfeiture law may explain why so few forfeitures are challenged. 433 Many property owners do not have the financial resources necessary to hire a lawyer to fight the forfeiture. 434 In fact, property owners
may decide that their property is not worth the money they would be
forced to pay to attain legal representation. 435
Under Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation, legal representation
would be provided for individuals who lack the financial resources necessary to obtain independent legal representation. 436 CAFRA would also
eliminate the current bond requirement because it is inequitable as applied to indigent property owners and serves no real purpose in other
cases. 437 Willie Jones, a black Tennessee nurseryman, had $9600 seized
because he allegedly tit the description of a drug courier. 438 Even though
his money was improperly seized, Willie Jones was nearly forced to forfeit his money because he did not have the financial resources necessary
to post the required ten percent bond. 439 Luckily, a reputable attorney

429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Jd. at 55.
ld. at 81.
Levy, supra note 19, at 212.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 81.
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See supra notes 308-309 and accompanying text.
Hyde, supra note 2, at 81.
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learned of the civil forfeiture abuse and volunteered his assistance to
Willie Jones. 440
CAPRA would further extend the time period for filing a claim to
recover property from ten to sixty days. 441 Finally, CAPRA would protect
innocent property owners. 442 By providing that property used to facilitate
a crime may be confiscated unless the violation was "committed ... without the knowledge or consent of the owner," CAPRA unequivocally
states that a lack of consent, coupled with reasonable efforts to avoid the
illegal activity, may constitute a valid defense to a civil forfeiture. 443
2.

Legislative oversight

Under current forfeiture procedures, law enforcement agencies are
not required to report expenditures from asset forfeiture revenue. 444 These
agencies should, however, be subjected to "annual authorization and appropriation bills passed by the Congress."445 Such legislative oversight
would charge legislators with public accountability for the use of civil
forfeiture and would operate to deter egregious civil forfeiture abuses. 446
In fact, Justice Thomas noted in Bennis that "[l]egislators, not the
courts ... have 'the primary responsibility for avoiding [inequitable civil
forfeiture] result[ s].' " 447

H.

Civil Forfeiture Reform As Applied To Bennis

Innocent property owners, such as Tina Bennis, would clearly benefit
from the implementation of civil forfeiture reform. 448 Specifically,
CAPRA would have protected Tina Bennis from civil forfeiture on several different fronts. 449 For example, CAPRA would have provided Tina
Bennis with court-appointed counseV50 Moreover, CAPRA would codify
an innocent owner's defense which would have shielded Tina Bennis
from the forfeiture of her interest in the Bennis family car. 451 Finally, under CAPRA, Tina Bennis could have petitioned the court to temporarily
return the Pontiac due to "substantial hardship" pending a final judicial
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disposition. 452 Thus, Tina Bennis would have benefited if CAFRA had
been adopted prior to the commencement of the Bennis litigation. 453
V. CoNcLUSION

As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting op1mon in Bennis,
"[f]undamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people." 454
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bennis v. Michigan, 455 is
inequitable and a derogation of principles of fundamental fairness. In
Bennis, John and Tina Bennis co-owned a 1977 Pontiac. The Pontiac was
seized when John Bennis used the car as the location for engaging in sexual relations with a known prostitute. Tina Bennis challenged the forfeiture because she was unaware of her husband's illicit conduct. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the forfeiture of the automobile, despite
Tina Bennis' complete lack of crilninal culpability. The Bennis decision
is inequitable because Tina Bennis was entirely innocent, and therefore,
not properly punishable.
The Bennis decision gives the government the power to take an innocent owner's property under the pretext of abating a nuisance. Under
Bennis, the government is further empowered to arbitrarily declare anything a nuisance and to punish innocent individuals. The government may
now set its sights on an ideal piece of property and effectively seize such
property under the guise of civil forfeiture power. In fact, "[a] land grab
described as part of the war against drugs would be [an ideal] official
cover for a city that wanted to build a freeway off-ramp ... without paying land acquisition costs." 456 Donald Scott knows this only too well his only crime was owning million dollar property in which the government was interested. Civil forfeiture law also empowers the government
to seize an innocent owner's property for merely associating with a crilninal. Adequate parameters no longer lilnit the application of civil forfeiture.
Congressman Henry Hyde has proposed the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act in an effort to elilninate civil forfeiture abuses. This act, if
passed, would provide lilnitations on civil forfeiture, thereby making it a
useful and effective doctrine, instead of a profit-seeking law enforcement
tool. CAFRA would place the burden of proof on the State, rather than on
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See supra notes 296-297 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289-309 and accompanying text.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007; Savage, supra note at 47.
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
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property owners, thereby safeguarding property owners against the arbitrary seizure of their property. CAPRA would also provide courtappointed counsel for property owners with limited financial resources.
Thus, CAPRA would enable indigent property owners to contest a suspicious seizure. CAPRA would also completely eliminate the current bond
requirement. In addition, CAPRA would allow the courts to temporarily
return seized property to property owners on a showing of substantial
hardship pending a final judicial resolution. Thus, Chairman Hyde's bill
would provide a useful curb on the government's insatiable appetite for
confiscating private property, while maintaining civil forfeiture as a
crime-fighting mechanism.
Passionate individuals must speak up in order to protect their constitutional rights and to persuade Congress to act. Civil forfeiture abuses
jeopardize the fundamental rights that most Americans cherish, but often
take for granted. As Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion in
Bennis, although punishing an innocent owner appears to be unfair, "this
case is a reminder that the Constitution does not prohibit everything that
is intensely undesirable." 457 Tina Bennis learned this first-hand. Unless
civil forfeiture reform occurs, you could be the next victim of the government's greed.

Charlena Toro

457. Savage, supra note 33, at 47.

